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CASE NOTES
or pension plans to which he has contributed, the plaintiff actually paid
out of his pocket in advance for such future benefits, and where the plain-
tiff has not contributed, such payments by the collateral source, usually
the employer, are compensation for past services of the plaintiff.22 Thus
to permit recovery, these courts consider both pensions and insurance as
something for which the plaintiff has paid over the years, with his serv-
ices or the premium deductions serving as his compensatory loss.
The Coyne case highlights this difference in rationale among the courts
and stands firmly on the compensatory theory of damages. There is an
inconsistency in the decisions of these courts, upholding the compensatory
theory, in that they allow full recovery in the contribution cases. Under
this theory, it would seem that the plaintiff should be allowed to recover
only the premiums or payments for the insurance plan or pension fund to
which they contributed his out-of-pocket loss.
Benefits from a collateral source will aid either the plaintiff or the de-
fendant. Whether the benefit given to the plaintiff was one of friendship,
philanthropy, or contract, the interests of the parties and society are bet-
ter served where the courts apply the collateral source doctrine and the
plaintiff, to whom the gift was intended, is allowed the benefit.
22 Poniatowski v. City of New York, 220 N.Y.S. 2d 854, 30 Misc. 2d 865 (1961);
Devine v. City of Chicago, 172 Ill. App. 246 (1912).
DAMAGES-COMPUTATION BY USE OF A
PER DIEM FORMULA
During the trial of a rear-end automobile accident case, plaintiff's at-
torney suggested to the jury that fair compensation for his client's pain
and suffering could be computed by using a mathematical formula in
which a given dollar value was assigned to each day of pain and suffering
and then multiplied over the plaintiff's lifetime as computed on a standard
mortality table. The defendant appealed the $20,000 verdict, assigning as
error the use of a per diem argument for pain and suffering. The Appel-
late'Court affirmed, holding that the per diem argument was logically
suggested by the evidence and that per diem argument falls within ac-
cepted lines of advocacy. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new
trial, ruling that although counsel might suggest a total monetary award
for pain and suffering, the practice of counsel explaining to the jury a
formula and suggested figures to arrive at a suggested amount of money
for pain and suffering transcends the bounds of proper argument. Caley
v. Manicke, 24 I11. 2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206 (1962).
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Illinois lawyers have for several years introduced the per diem concept
to juries at the inception of personal injury cases, consumating their ad-
vocacy with a breakdown to the minute and hour in final argument.
Taught to master this technique' and motivated by higher verdicts, law-
yers found an economic sting to this decision.2 The strong dissent of
Justice Dove in the Appellate Court and the imbroglio stirred by this is-
sue in neighboring jurisdictions prompted the Illinois Supreme Court to
grant a certificate of importance to consider whether the scope of proper
jury argument permits the use of such formulae in assessing damages for
pain and suffering. In a twenty-eight word sentence the court put an end
to this highly successful trial technique in Illinois. The court sized up the
arguments pro and con. It selected two of the most solid arguments for
permission of the technique, then hacked these away in a remarkable ellip-
tical and ambivalent apology of the jury system. "It begs the question to
say that the jury needs to be guided by some ,reasonable and practical
consideration. 3 Although the court rose above a slavish repetition, it was
provided an arsenal of argument in support of its decision by recent rul-
ings of five neighboring courts. A review of the reasoning of these courts
juxtaposed with the reasons of those which have considered and decided
to permit mathematical formulations in final argument will bring the issue
to focus.
Elemental in trial technique is the rule that argument to the jury should
be limited to the facts; that testimony should not be first delivered in the
closing argument.4 The pivot of the court's reasoning in Botta v. Brun-
ner5 is that there is no basis in the evidence for converting pain and suf-
fering into units of money and that suggestion by counsel transcends
1 "This is the key: You must break up the 30 year life expectancy into finite, de-
tailed periods of time. You must take these small periods of time, seconds, and minutes,
and determine in dollars and cents what each period is worth. You must start with
the seconds and minutes rather than at the other end of the thirty years. You cannot
stand in front of a jury and say, 'Here is a-man horribly injured, permanently disabled,
who will suffer excruciating pain for the rest of his life, he is entitled to a verdict of
$225,000!' You must start at the beginning and show that pain is a continuous thing,
second by second, minute by minute, hour by hour, year after year'for thirty years.
You must interpret one second, one minute, one hour, one year of pain and suffering
into dollars and cents and then multiply to your absolute figure to show how you have
achieved your result of an award approaching adequacy at $225,000." BELLI, THE MORE
ADEQUATE AWARD (1951).
2 The National Association of Claimant's Compensation Attorneys recognized the
relation between per diem argument and larger verdicts. It has filed Amicus Curiae
briefs in several of the recent cases involving the question of the use of a formula.
3 Caley v. Manicke, 24Ill..2d 390, 182 N.E. 2d 206,.208 (1962).
4 Insurance Co. v. Sides, 279 S.W.. 2d 114. (Texas:Ct. of Appeals, 1955).
5 26 N.J. 82, 138 A. 2d 713. (1958). The '.formula suggested was fori past pain and
suffering.
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allowable limits of inference from the evidence. 6 The New Jersey court
was consistent in its logic, for it went beyond the immediate issue to bar
plaintiff's counsel from suggesting even a total monetary valuation for
pain and suffering. In the instant case the Illinois court forbids the break-
down of pain and suffering into units of money per unit of time, but it
specifies that the suggestion of a total figure, "less misleading," is not im-
proper.7 The resulting tangle of logic is exposed by Justice Solfisburg in
his dissent.8 Several courts have found the subjective nature of pain and
suffering irreconcilable with the neat precision of arithmetical calcula-
tion.9 The Illinois court holds pain and suffering, because it has no com-
mercial value, is best measured by "a subjective process which is easier
to comprehend than define."'1 The court warns of another pitfall-that
if plaintiff's counsel may use per diem calculation, defense counsel must
also be permitted to do so. This process, says the court, will only com-
pound the confusion for the jury." The court here appears to have given
to the jury with one hand and taken with the other, for shortly before,
in refuting the "blind guess" theory, the court said that it does not take
such a "dim view" of the jury's reasoning processes. What the court is
saying impliedly is that the traditional criterion for measure of pain and
8 Justice Dove in the Illinois Appellate Court bottomed his dissent on this conviction.
"[Sluch per diem argument is neither suggested by any evidence in the record nor does
such an argument fall within the accepted bounds of advocacy." Caley v. Manicke, 29
111. App. 2d 323, 348, 173 N.E. 2d 209, 220 (1961). In reversing the Appellate Court the
Illinois Supreme Court did not rely on this point.
7 Caley v. Manicke, 24 I11. 2d 390, 182 N.E. 2d 206 (1962). Statement of the total
amount sued for is approved in several jurisdictions: Alabama: Clark v. Hudson, 265
Ala. 630, 93 So. 2d 138 (1956); Missouri: Dean v. Wabash R. Co., 229 Mo. 425, 129
S.W. 953 (1910); New Hampshire: Saunders v. Boston & M.R.R., 77 N.H. 381,92 At].
546 (1914); New York: Haley v. Hockey, 103 N.Y.S. 2d 717 (1950); Oklahoma: Coca
Cola Bottling Co. v. Black, 186 Okl. 596, 99 P. 2d 891 (1940).
8 Caley v. Manicke, 24 IlI. 2d 390, 182 N.E. 2d 206, 210 (1962). In Yates v. Wenk, 363
Mich. 311, 109 N.W. 2d 828 (1961), on the issue of a per diem formula used to compute
damages for pain and suffering the court held: "The same speculative quality which
exists in a lawyer's estimate of money value of a day's pain and suffering exists likewise
in plaintiff's ad damnum clause and in the jury verdict to the extent that they allow
for pain and suffering. Michigan permits plaintiff's claim as set forth in the ad damnum
clause to be placed before the jury... . We see little merit in forbidding lawyers to try
to help in that difficult task." The court added that the influence practices on a jury
by the per diem argument of plaintiff's counsel would ordinarily be countervailed by
counsel for the defense. Id. at 831. See also, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mattingly, 339
S.W. 2d 155 (Ky., 1960).
9 Bostwick v. Pittsburgh R. Co., 255 Pa. 387, 100 Ad. 123 (1917); Gorczyca v. New
York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 141 Conn. 701, 109 A. 2d 589 (1954).
10 All courts seem to agree that no witness, expert Qr otherwise, may offer his
opinion on the question of what constitutes reasonable compensation for future pain
and suffering. McCoRMICK, EVIDENcE 26 (1954).
11 Caley v. Manicke, 24111. 2d 390, 182 N.E. 2d 206 (1962).
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suffering-a fair and reasonable compensation determined by the sound
discretion of the jury-is the best.12 This conclusion must spring from a
belief that if plaintiff's counsel is permitted to present a mathematical
formula calculated on a daily or other fixed basis he invades the province
of the jury.13 The Illinois court disallows such formulation even for illus-
tration. "The contention that the court's instruction would dispel their
use by the jury as evidence ignores human nature."'14 This observation
rings inconsistent in the same decision in which the court places its trust
so firmly in the cognative prowess of the jury. The court leaves the jury
to assess damages "at a sum of money which you may find and believe
from the evidence will fairly, reasonably and adequately compensate him
(plaintiff) for the injuries sustained." The court would concede that
money never will adequately compensate for a broken head or a sightless
eye. It would agree that the translation of pain and suffering into dollars
and cents is most difficult. It sends the jury out, nevertheless, with only a
vague outline, denying it the tools and the experience of the court to
manage the evaluation. In prohibiting "counsels' partisan conscience and
judgment" and opposing counsels' equally partisan rebuttal, the court,
seems to pay little heed to the purpose of the litigation. The plaintiff sues
for money; the defendant defends against an award of money. The jury
must reduce human injury to a money "equivalent." Justice Solfisburg
cautions that the very absence of an objective standard of evaluating pain
and suffering should make us reluctant to circumscribe counsel in analyz-
ing this issue.
Although trial attorneys would not argue the rule against introduction
of new facts in summary, they still would point up a corollary.
While it is the duty of the court to see to it that no advantage is obtained by
improper remarks of counsel made to or in the presence of the jury, still
counsel cannot be put into a straight-jacket when making their arguments, but
within reasonable bounds of propriety, must be left to their own discretion.1"
Proponents of the per diem argument contend that the primary purpose
of argument by counsel is to enlighten the jury.' 6 Admitting, indeed,
pointing out, that the argument is not evidence in itself, they state that a
juror is unable to ascertain properly what such an amorphous item as
12 Cooley v. Crispino, 21 Conn. Supp. 150, 147 A. 2d 497 (1958).
"3 Certified T.V. and Appliance Co. v. Harington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E. 2d 126 (1959).
14 In Minnesota counsel may suggest a formula as a means by which the jury may
arrive at a verdict without supplying a specific time unit or per unit amount. Boutang
v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Mn. 240, 80 N.W. 2d 30 (1956).
"5 Goldstein v. Smiley, 168 111. 438, 444, 48 N.E. 203, affirming 68 111. App. 49 (1897);
Nusbaum v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 340 Il1. App. 131, 90 N.E. 2d 921 (1950).
16 88 C.J.S. TRIAL J 169 (1955).
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future pain and suffering is worth; that he needs some criterion to assist
him in arriving at a fair award. They assert that in suggesting a formula
they are merely drawing reasonable inference from the testimony.'
But the very absence of a fixed rule or standard for any monetary admeasure-
ment of pain and suffering as an element of damages supplies a reason why
counsel for the parties should be allotted, on this item of damages, their en-
titled latitude in argument-to comment on the evidence, its nature and effect,
and to note all proper inferences which reasonably may spring from the evi-
dence adduced.' 8
Trial lawyers question why the ordinary power of the courts to offer a
remittitur or a new trial is now considered inadequate. In Imperial Oil v.
Drlik'9 the court recognized and admitted the difficulty a jury encounters
in assessing damages for pain and suffering. It held that in the determina-
tion of the amount of the award a juror should necessarily be guided by
some reasonable and practical considerations. "It should not be a blind
guess or the pulling of a figure out of the air." The court submitted that
it was more concerned that justice be done, consistent with the evidence,
than with the modus operandi. Further, personal injury lawyers contend
that the court can make abundantly clear in instructing the jury that
counsel's per diem argument is purely a suggestion and that defendant's
counsel is free to use a formula to calculate his suggested allowance for
pain and suffering.2 0 It is better to allow a concrete formula to be pre-
sented to give the jury some basis to arrive at a verdict rather risk too
high a verdict, which can be cured by remittitur, than to leave the jurors
to fix a damage figure "by guess and by golly."'21 These cases recognize
the lack of precision connected with assessment of damages, but just as
uncertainty of damages is no bar to recovery, so impossibility of mathe-
17 True, counsel in argument to the jury may not argue as fact that which is not in
the evidence. Counsel may, however, comment on all proper inferences from the evi-
dence and draw conclusions from the evidence based upon his own reasoning. Mc.aney
v. Turner, 267 Ala. 588, 104 So. 2d 315 (1958). Within reasonable limits counsel may
argue to the jury the amount of damages it should return when that argument is based
on the extent of the injuries the evidence shows the plaintiff has suffered. Aetna Oil Co.
v. Metcalf, 298 Ky. 706, 183 S.W. 2d 637 (1944), aff'd, 300 Ky. 817, 190 SAV.2d 562
(1945). See also: 53 Am. Jur. TRIAL H 46-65 (1945).
18 Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82, 89 (Fla. 1959); Continental Bus Sys. v. Toombs,
325 S.W. 2d 153 (Tex. 1959).
19 234 F. 2d 4 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956).
20 In one situation recounted in 6 Defense L.J. 142 (1959) counsel for defendant was
able to turn the tables on the plaintiff. He illustrated to the jury how the sum de-
manded by the plaintiff, if invested at a 4% return, would yield plaintiff an annual ill-
come for life in excess of his normal earnings and the principal would remain un-
touched.
21 Texas & N.O. R.Co. v. Flowers, 336 S.W. 2d 907, 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
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matical accuracy should not restrain counsel from suggesting a per diem
formula.
The Illinois court's evaluation of the propriety of the per diem sugges-
tion and the carte blanche22 given the jury in Caley reflects in relief the
overriding problem of adopting some decisive criterion for the appraisal
of pain and suffering awards. Lacking a definitive standard, the difficulty
in control and direction of the jury award for pain and suffering creates
a hesitancy in the court to accept a procedural device which has been
shown to appreciably increase the award. Confronted by cries of illogic
and favoritism from plaintiffs and by the furor stirred by defendants and
special interests23 over the ever increasing money verdicts in personal in-
jury cases, the Illinois Supreme Court made its decision with wisdom and
foresight. Neither in stare decisis nor in cold logic is the court's dis-
tinction found, its decision justified. In Caley the court appears to have
looked beyond the present controversy to enunciate sub rosa, a policy
which will forestall and pre-empt the movement for legislative control
looming in the wake of high personal injury verdicts and settlements. 24
From a practical standpoint the court's conservatism, its reliance on the
jury system on which Anglo-American law has traditionally relied, is a
healthy conservatism. On one hand the decision is limited in scope, leav-
ing room for resort by attorneys to other methods of argument. On the
other hand the court had recognized and avoided the spector of a legisla-
lative ukase limiting or schedulizing awards in personal injury cases.25
Illinois lawyers, at the court's direction, have suffered a setback which
will likely prove a blessing. The decision finds its great merit in protect-
ing the exclusiveness of judicial control of the officers of the court at
trial; to permit per diem argument might only enhance the possibility of
straitening legislative regulation.
22 "Jurors are as familiar with pain and suffering and with money as are counsel. We
are of the opinion that an impartial jury which has been properly informed by the
evidence and the court's instructions will, by the exercise of its conscience and sound
judgment, be better able to determine reasonable compensation than it would if it were
subjected to counsel's partisan conscience and judgment on the matter." Caley v.
Manicke, 24 Ill. 2d 390, 182 N.E. 2d at 209.
23 See 20 INs. COUNSEL J. 14 (1953), Article.
24 See Zelermyer, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27 (1954) ad-
vocating legislative price-setting for pain and suffering.
25 Perhaps there is no more lucid example of just how far a formula can influence a
jury to rely on it than the case of Seaboard Airline R. Co. v. Braddock, 96 So. 2d 127
(Fla. 1957), where the jury returned a verdict of $248,439, the exact dollar amount as
computed by the plaintiff's counsel during his closing argument. It is this probable
impact on the jury which prompted the court in the Botta case to say: "If the day ever
arrives when that type of speculation becomes accepted by the courts generally as a
fair mathematical factor for use by juries, proponents of the view that motor vehicle
accident injury claims should be treated on some basis similar to workmen's compen-
sation, will have grist for their mill." Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d at 723 (1958).
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Inevitably, the court's opinion will be sounded in search of admissible
phrasing of a money-oriented argument. The opinion does not seem to
preclude a breakdown of the alleged duration of past and future suffering
into small time units and, where the evidence warrants, the introduction
of life and expectancy tables.2 0 A decision of this nature will generate re-
search and an invigorating resourcefulness by those disgruntled attorneys
whose interests are, for the moment, somewhat displaced. Novel and
theatrical uses of demonstrative evidence will possibly ensue, fostering
the "hollywood" trial which courts uniformly eschew. It would seem,
however, that in the balance may be the ultimate integrity of judicial
control of judicial affairs.
26 Presumably counsel is free to use a per diem basis to calculate loss of future earn-
ings in his final argument, provided there has been testimony as to plaintiff's past
earnings and his diminished earning capacity. The prohibition in Caley appears to be
limited to the amount demanded for pain and suffering.
EVIDENCE-DECLARATION AGAINST PENAL INTEREST
EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY RULE
McGraw brought a negligence action against one Horn to recover
damages for injuries that were sustained in an automobile accident. Mc-
Graw alleged she was a passenger in an automobile driven by one Smith,
and that she was injured as a result of Horn's negligent operation of his
automobile. At the trial a police officer was permitted to testify as to a
conversation with Smith which took place in a hospital one-half hour
after the accident. The officer testified that Smith told him he did not see
Horn's car nor the Yield Right of Way sign. The jury returned a ver-
dict for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. On appeal it was urged
by the plaintiff that the testimony of the officer was pure hearsay and
came within no exception to the hearsay rule; that the officer's testimony
did not fall within the declaration against interest exception because the
statement by Smith could only have subjected Smith to penal or civil
liability. The Indiana Appellate Court agreed with the contentions of the
plaintiff and reversed the decision of the trial court. The Court held that
to render such extrajudicial statements admissible, they must be against
the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant and not merely
such as would subject him to criminal action or civil suit. McGraw v.
Horn, 183 N.E. 2d 206 (Ind. 1962).
The decision of the Court recognized the well-established rule that any
statement that is a narration of a past event by a person who is not a wit-
ness in the case constitutes hearsay.' Although the hearsay rule is deeply
1 State v. Labbee, 134 Wash. 55, 234 Pac. 1049 (1925).
